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Abstract
The Statute of the International Court of Justice stipulates
that judges shall exercise their powers impartially. We ques-
tion the practicability of this statement and examine wheth-
er the voting pattern of the judges are biased. In this light,
empirical research is conducted on cases adjudicated from
2005 to 2016. We find strong evidence that (1) judges
favour their home States or appointing States; and (2) judg-
es favour States that speak same majority language with
their home States.
Keywords: voting pattern, ICJ judges, empirical research
1 Introduction
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is one of the
principal organs of the United Nations (UN) and was
established in accordance with Article 7 of the Charter
of the UN in 1945.1 The ICJ Statute is the constitution-
al document for the ICJ, which is an integral part of the
UN Charter. The ICJ accepts cases that only involve
States as applicant and respondent.2 All member States
of the UN, covering almost all States in the world, are
ipso facto parties to the ICJ Statue.3 The ICJ possesses a
broad jurisdiction covering all matters and all cases that
State parties refer to it.4 Most common types of cases
before the ICJ include boundary dispute, use of force,
property rights and aerial incidents.5
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1. The UN Charter, signed on 26 June 1945, entered into force on 24
October 1945.
2. Art. 34(1) of the ICJ Statute.
3. Art. 93(1) of the UN Charter.
4. Art. 36(1) of the ICJ Statute.
5. T. Ginsburg and R.H. McAdams, ‘Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expres-
sive Theory of International Dispute Resolution’, 45 William & Mary
Law Review 1229, at 1229-1340 (2004).
The ICJ consists of fifteen permanent judges, each of
whom shall come from a different State.6 Usually all
these fifteen judges shall sit before a particular case.7
But there are two exceptions. One is applied when a
judge is on leave (judicial vocations or periodic leaves)
or prevented from attending due to illness8 or because
that he or she should not take part in the decision of a
particular case for some special reason.9 Another excep-
tion is that the ICJ may form a chamber composed of
three or more judges to deal with particular categories of
cases, such as labour cases and cases concerning transit
and communications.10 Notably, the form of chambers
has not been commonly used by the ICJ to date.
Between 2005 and 2016, only one case among thirty-two
contentious cases has utilised the form of a chamber.11 A
State party can appoint an ad hoc judge if no judge of its
nationality sits among the permanent judges.12 As a
result, under normal circumstances, there will be fifteen
to seventeen judges sitting for an ICJ case.
It is stated in the ICJ Statute that the ICJ judges, either
permanent or ad hoc, shall exercise his or her powers
impartially.13 This paper is interested in whether this
statement is in line with the practice. In this light, the
research question of this paper is whether the voting
pattern of the ICJ judges is biased. For this purpose, an
empirical study is conducted. As to the structure of this
paper, the second part summarises the previous litera-
ture on the same topic. On this basis, the third part
introduces the methodology for this study. Relevant
data are described in the fourth part and results of the
empirical analysis are presented in the fifth part. In the
6. Art. 3(1) of the ICJ Statute. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 3(2) of the
ICJ Statute, in case of a judge having more than one nationality, he or
she shall be deemed to be a national of the one in which he or she ordi-
narily exercises civil and political rights.
7. Art. 25(1) of the ICJ Statute.
8. Art. 23 of the ICJ Statute.
9. Art. 24 of the ICJ Statute.
10. Art. 26 of the ICJ Statute.
11. The case using a chamber is the 2004 Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger)
case. The ICJ declared a Chamber to deal with this case composed of
five judges. See Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger), Order of 16 February
2005 (Composition of Chamber), available at: <www. icj -cij. org/ docket/
files/ 125/ 11047. pdf> (last visited 25 November 2017). Among these
five judges, one is from the application State Benin, and one is from the
respondent State Niger. As a result, this special chamber form does not
affect our final calculations.
12. Art. 31 of the ICJ Statute.
13. Art. 20 of the ICJ Statute.
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sixth part, we discuss some possible explanations for the
results that we have observed. Several conclusions are
drawn in the final part.
2 Literature Review
A considerable amount of literature addresses the voting
behaviour of international judges from the perspective
of normative analysis. Some literature explores the his-
torical development of the legal regime of national judg-
es, especially ad hoc judges. Article 31 of the ICJ Statute
sets forth the regime of ad hoc judges, as mentioned
above. In fact, this provision mirrors Article 31 of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ), which was the predecessor of the ICJ.14 In
accordance with the preparatory work regarding the
drafting process of Article 31 of the PCIJ Statute, the ad
hoc judges’ regime was established for the purpose of
addressing the inequality between parties which might
be caused when there was “upon the bench a judge of
the nationality of only one of the parties to the case”.15
In this light, Lord Phillimore, a member of the Advisory
Committee, stated:
it would be preferable to give a national representa-
tive to both parties, not only to protect their interests,
but to enable the Court to understand certain ques-
tions which require highly specialised knowledge and
relate to the differences between the various legal sys-
tems.16
In a similar vein, several scholars have addressed the rai-
son d’être of the national judges, especially ad hoc judg-
es, by underlining the political necessity behind this
regime.17 In particular, it is pointed out that:
If during the deliberations it becomes apparent that,
despite the best efforts of counsel for the party, the
case presented by that party has not been clearly
understood, the national judge is best placed to
appreciate this, and…can ensure that any rejection of
that approach – whether he himself favours such
rejection or not – is reasoned in such a way as to reas-
sure the party that its point of view has been under-
stood, and that justice has been done.18
14. A. Zimmermann et al., The Statute of the International Court of justice:
A commentary (2012), at 533.
15. Ibid., at 531.
16. League of Nations. Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-verbaux of
the proceedings of the Committee, June 16th-July 24th, 1920, with
Annexes, at 528-9, available at: <https:// archive. org/ details/
procsverbauxof00leaguoft> (last visited 25 November 2017).
17. S. Rosenne, The International Court of Justice: An Essay in Political and
Legal Theory (1957), at 147; M. Kuijer, ‘Voting Behaviour and National
Bias in the European Court of Human Rights and the International
Court of Justice’, 10 Leiden Journal of International Law 49, at 51-2,
54-6 (1997); S. Nāgendra, The Role and Record of the International
Court of Justice (1989), at 193-4.
18. Nāgendra, above n. 17, at 193-4.
It is widely accepted that the above described function
of the national judges, namely to ensure the full under-
standing of the case presented by a State party, can
increase the confidence of that State party in participat-
ing in relevant international dispute settlement proce-
dures.19
Furthermore, some literature aims at identifying the
factors influencing the impartiality of international
judges. Inter alia, it is suggested that the ICJ is a “semi-
legal, semi-judicial, semi-political body which nations
sometimes accept and sometimes not”.20 Put differently,
the decisions made by the ICJ are not only based on
legal considerations but also on political considerations.
Besides, influential factors on judicial behaviour are
summarised as including legal education and training,
views on the function of law, conceptions of institution-
al propriety and belonging, wider external community
expectations, and national or political bias.21
In addition to normative analysis, some scholars also
conduct empirical researches on this topic. Neverthe-
less, most empirical researches only focus on the voting
behaviour of the national judges, including judges elec-
ted or appointed ad hoc, in cases where their home or
appointing States are involved, namely “the extent to
which national judges reach their decisions consistently
with the position of their national governments”.22
These researches show that the national judges have
voted in favour of his/her own government in more
than 90% of the disputes.23 As observed by William
Samore, “except in the most isolated of instances, it
would be unrealistic to expect that a judge of an interna-
tional tribunal would ever vote against the country of his
origin or nationality”.24 In concreto, some scholars con-
clude that ad hoc judges are more likely to vote in favour
of their appointing States than permanent judges.25
19. Kuijer, above n. 17, at 66-7.
20. D.R. Robinson, ‘The Role of Politics in the Election and the Work of
Judges of the International Court of Justice’, 97 Proceedings of the
Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 277, at
277-82 (2003). Also see M. Reisman, ‘Metamorphoses: Judge Shigeru
Oda and the International Court of Justice’, 33 Canadian Yearbook of
International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international 185, at
185-221 (1996); A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty:
Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (1996).
21. G.I. Hernández, ‘Impartiality and Bias at the International Court of Jus-
tice’, 1 Cambridge J. Int’l & Comp. L. 183, at 183-207 (2012).
22. Kuijer, above n. 17, at 50; I.R. Suh, ‘Voting Behavior of National Judges
in International Courts’, 63 American Journal of International Law 224,
at 224-36 (1969).
23. “In almost 94% of the disputes, the national judge voted in favour of
his own government…In only four instances did a judge vote against
the position of his government.” See Kuijer, above n. 17, at 63. In
accordance with Il Ro Suh’s research, about 91% (108 out of 119) of
the ad hoc judges voted in favour of their governments’ positions in the
contentious cases or advisory opinions of the PCIJ and the ICJ between
1922 and 1967. See Suh, above n. 22, at 228, 230.
24. W. Samore, ‘National Origins v. Impartial Decisions: A Study of World
Court Holdings’, 34 Chicago-Kent Law Review 193, at 193-221 (1955).
25. In accordance with Il Ro Suh’s research, about 91% of the ad hoc judg-
es voted in favour of their governments’ positions while only about
70% of the permanent judges voted for their home States. See Suh,
above n. 22, at 228, 230. ‘It is true that a regular judge should possess
a greater sense of responsibility toward his judicial duties than a judge
who is specially appointed. For this reason, the case against ad hoc
judges is stronger’. See Samore, above n. 24, at 204.
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One of the most systematic empirical researches on this
topic was done by Posner and de Figueiredo who stud-
ied the ICJ cases from 1946, the beginning year of the
ICJ’s operations, to 2004, one year before the publica-
tion of their research.26 Unlike the above referred
researches, this research analysed not only the voting
behaviour of national judges but also non-national judg-
es. Their research showed that national bias played an
important role in influencing the decision-making of the
ICJ.27 Detailed findings of this research included that
the ICJ judges voted for their home States or appointing
States about 90% of the time. Moreover, when their
home States or appointing States were not involved, the
ICJ judges were more likely to vote for States that were
similar to their home States or appointing States along
the dimensions of wealth, culture and political regime.28
3 Methodology
Inspired by the above referred literature, our research
intends to conduct a continued study on the ICJ cases
between 2005 and 2016. The research purpose is to
examine whether the aforesaid findings based on the
data between 1946 and 2004 made by Posner and de
Figueiredo are still applicable to the data between 2005
and 2016.
Our null hypothesis is that the voting pattern of the ICJ
judges is unbiased. Assuming the null hypothesis is
true, decisions made by the ICJ judges are influenced
only by relevant legal considerations, such as the proper
interpretation or application of an international rule, but
not by legally irrelevant considerations, such as whether
the applicant or respondent is the judge’s home State (in
the case of permanent judges) or appointing State (in
the case of ad hoc judges).29
On the premise of the null hypothesis, our first hypoth-
esis can be stated as below: no difference exists in the
voting pattern of an ICJ judge no matter whether his or
her home State or appointing State is an applicant or
respondent to a particular case or not. A judge whose
home State or appointing State is a party to the case can
be called a ‘party judge’, and otherwise a ‘nonparty
judge’.
The second hypothesis is that no difference exists in the
voting pattern of an ICJ judge no matter whether the
applicant or respondent to a particular case shares the
same or similar political, economic or cultural levels
with the judge’s home State or appointing State. As
inspired by the referred literature, we use democracy,
wealth and language to respectively illustrate or measure
the political, economic or cultural levels of relevant
26. E.A. Posner and M.F.P. de Figueiredo, ‘Is the International Court of Jus-
tice Biased?’, 34 The Journal of Legal Studies 599, at 599-630 (2005).
27. Ibid., at 624.
28. Ibid. Posner and de Figueiredo also examined other variables but they
did not find significant results. These variables include region, NATO,
cold war, jurisdiction, type of cases, judge country, applicant and
respondent countries.
29. Ibid., at 600-1.
States.30 We code the variables, including one depend-
ent variable and six explanatory variables, as follows (see
Table 1.
3.1 Judge-Vote
The dependent variable. In accordance with Article
95(1) of the 1978 Rules of Court, the ICJ judgements
shall contain the number and names of the judges con-
stituting the majority.31 Consequently, these judge-
ments are able to show clearly each judge’s vote on each
issue.32 The value of this variable equals to one if the
judge rules in favour of the applicant and zero other-
wise. Usually judges are asked to decide on more than
one substantive issue in one case. Under such circum-
stances, we code judges as voting in favour of the appli-
cant if they join the majority or concurrence which
upholds everything or significant requests that the
applicant seek, or if they dissent when the majority
opinion does not support the significant requests that
the applicant seeks.33
3.2 App-Nationality
An explanatory variable. The value of this variable
equals to one if the applicant and judge’s home State or
appointing State match and zero otherwise. The data on
nationality of applicants and judges can be accessed
from the ICJ judgements.
3.3 Res-Nationality
An explanatory variable. The value of this variable
equals to one if the respondent and judge’s home State
or appointing State match and zero otherwise. The data
on nationality of respondents and judges can be accessed
from the ICJ judgements.
3.4 Democracy
An explanatory variable. We follow the formula used by
Posner and de Figueiredo for the democracy measure34
as below:
|(judge’s State’s democracy score – respondent’s
democracy score)| – |(judge’s State’s democracy
score – applicant’s democracy score)|
30. Ibid., at 607-10.
31. Art. 95(1) of the 1978 Rules of Court, adopted on 14 April 1978 and
entered into force on 1 July 1978.
32. Data of the ICJ judgements, available at: <www. icj -cij. org/ en/ cases>
(last visited 25 November 2017).
33. For example, in the 2014 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan:
New Zealand intervening) case, the majority opinion upheld the appli-
cant’s claims. However, four judges (Judges Owada (Japan), Abraham
(France), Bennouna (Morocco), Yusuf (Somalia)) dissented the majority
opinion. Hence, twelve judges joining the majority opinion voted in
favour of the applicant while the foresaid four judges voted for the
respondent. Likewise, in the 2015 Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Ser-
bia) case, the majority opinion rejected the applicant’s claims. However,
two judges (Judge Cançado Trindade (Brazil); Judge ad hoc Vukas
(appointed by the applicant)) dissented the majority opinion. Hence, fif-
teen judges joining the majority opinion voted in favour of the respond-
ent while the foresaid two judges voted for the applicant.
34. Ibid., at 612.
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We obtain the data on democracy score for each State
from the database of Polity IV35 which ranges from –10
(authoritarian) to 10 (democracy).36 The democracy
score for each country corresponds to the Polity IV
35. We use the Polity IV Annual Time-Series (1800-2016) database devel-
oped by the Center for Systemic Peace as the reference for coding of
democracy, available at: <www. systemicpeace. org/ inscrdata. html> (last
visited 25 November 2011). The latest version was published on 25 July
2017. An earlier version was published in 2014, from 1946-2013. See
Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-2013, available at:
<www. systemicpeace. org/ polity/ polity4. htm> (last visited 25 Novem-
ber 2017).
36. It is noted that in Posner and de Figueiredo’s paper, though it also used
the data from Polity IV, the democracy score range that it gave was
from 0 (authoritarian) to 10 (democracy). This is because the indicator
we use in this research is POLITY, other than DEMOC used by Poser
and de Figueiredo. The reason for using the indicator POLITY is that
‘the POLITY score was added to the POLITY IV data series in recogni-
tion of its common usage by users in quantitative research and in the
overriding interest of miantaining uniformity among users in this appli-
cation’. In this sense, the POLITY score is a better way of conducting
empirical research. See M. Marshall, T.R. Gurr & K. Jaggers, ‘Polity IV
Project: Dataset Users’ Manual’, available at: <www. systemicpeace. org/
inscr/ p4manualv2016. pdf> (last visited 25 November 2011).
score for the year when the judgement was made.37 In
accordance with this formula, if the value of the democ-
racy measure is bigger than zero (positive value), it
means that the judge’s State has a closer democracy
score to the applicant. When the value is smaller than
zero (negative value), then the judge’s State has a closer
democracy score to the respondent. Otherwise (zero val-
ue) the democracy score of the judge’s State is neither
closer to the applicant nor the respondent.
3.5 Wealth
An explanatory variable. Like the democracy measure,
we also use a single variable for the wealth measure and
adopt the formula used by Posner and de Figueiredo38
as follows:
37. In the 2007 Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro case,
the score for Bosnia and Herzegovina is represented by Bosnia of 5. As
indicated by the 2017 database, Bosnia experienced interruption in the
year of this ICJ judgement. Thus, its democracy score for the year 2007
was -66, which represented ‘a period of interruption’. Due to mathe-
matic calculation consideration, we use the 2013 database in which
Bosnia got the score of 5, available at: <www. systemicpeace. org/ polity/
bos2. htm> (last visited 25 November 2011). Likewise, the democracy
score for Serbia and Montenegro is based on the score for Serbia and
Montenegro from 2003-2006, which stands at 6, excluding the impact
of 2006 referendum. In a similar vein, Somalia was experiencing inter-
regnum periods in 2009-2011 and thus its democracy score for this
period was -77, which represented ‘periods of interregnum during
which there is a complete collapse of central political authority’. Due to
calculation reasons, the score for Somalia in the 2009-2011 was -7 as
indicated in the 2013 database, available at: <www. systemicpeace. org/
polity/ som2. htm> (last visited 25 November 2017). In addition, the
score for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is represented by
the score for Macedonia, which remains at 9 during the research period.
See Marshall et al., above n. 36.
38. Posner and de Figueiredo, above n. 26, at 612.
Table 1 Variable Coding and Data Sources
Variables Coding & Sources
Judge-vote The dependent variable; equal to one if the judge rules in favour of the applicant and zero
otherwise; source from the ICJ website
App-nationality Equal to one if the applicant’s country and judge’s country match and zero otherwise;
source from the ICJ website
Res-nationality Equal to one if the respondent’s country and judge’s country match and zero otherwise;
source from the ICJ website
Democracy |(judge’s country’s democracy score – respondent’s democracy score)| – |(judge’s country’s
democracy score – applicant’s democracy score)|; source from Polity IV
Wealth |(judge’s country’s logged per capita GDP – respondent’s logged per capita GDP )| – |
(judge’s country’s logged per capita GDP – applicant’s logged per capita GDP )|; source
from IMF
App-language Equal to one if applicant and judge’s country have same majority language and zero other-
wise; source from www. macalester. edu
Res-language Equal to one if respondent and judge’s country have same majority language and zero oth-
erwise; source is www. macalester. edu
Note: Similar methodology of coding variables can be seen in Table A1 of Posner and de Figueiredo’s paper (above n. 26, at 627).
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|(judge’s State’s logged per capita GDP – respond-
ent’s logged per capita GDP )| – |(judge’s State’s
logged per capita GDP – applicant’s logged per capi-
ta GDP )|
We obtain the data on GDP based on PPP per capita for
each State for the year when the judgement was made
from the database of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF).39 Pursuant to this formula, if the value of the
wealth measure is bigger than zero (positive value), it
means that the judge’s State has a closer wealth level to
the applicant. When the value is smaller than zero (neg-
ative value), then the judge’s State has a closer wealth
level to the respondent. Otherwise (zero value) the
wealth level of the judge’s State is neither closer to the
applicant nor the respondent.40
3.6 App-Language
An explanatory variable. The value of this variable
equals to one if the applicant and judge’s home State or
appointing State have the same majority language and
zero otherwise. We obtain the data on the majority lan-
guage for each State from the database of Macales-
ter.edu.41
3.7 Res-Language
An explanatory variable. The value of this variable
equals to one if the respondent and judge’s home State
or appointing State have the same majority language and
zero otherwise.42
We mainly adopt two methods in this study. One is the
difference tool. Assuming the first hypothesis is true,
the ratios of party judges and nonparty judges voting in
favour of applicants (or respondents) shall be close.
Hence, we use the difference between the aforesaid
ratios to examine whether a judge is voting in a biased
way under the influence of the variable nationality. Nor-
mally, in a case, only two of the judges are party judges
and the rest (normally thirteen to fifteen judges) are
nonparty judges. If both party judges are biased, we
expect that their votes can cancel each other out and
thus their bias will not have an important impact on the
final outcome. Therefore, it is also of vital importance to
examine whether nonparty judges are biased.
With respect to the second hypothesis, we divide the
nonparty judges into two subgroups: nonparty judges
whose home States or appointing States share the same
39. Data on GDP based on PPP per capita from IMF, available at: <www.
imf. org/ external/ datamapper/ PPPPC@WEO/ OEMDC/ ADVEC/
WEOWORLD> (last visited 25 November 2017).
40. Somalia data are missing, thus it is coded as zero as Posner and de Fig-
ueiredo did in their research. Also, the data for Serbia and Montenegro
are calculated by ½ (Serbia + Montenegro).
41. Data on majority language for each State, available at: <https:// www.
macalester. edu/ research/ economics/ PAGE/ HAVEMAN/ Trade.
Resources/ Data/ Gravity/ language. txt> (last visited 25 November
2017).
42. There are several states that are not listed in the MACALESTER coding
system. Thus, the authors check the main language and code each
state. These States are as follows: (1) Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbo-
Croatian; (2) Serbia and Montenegro, Serbo-Croatian; (3) Ukraine,
Ukrainian; (4) Croatia, Serbo-Croatian.
or similar political, economic or cultural levels with
applicants (or respondents), and other nonparty judges.
Assuming the second hypothesis is true, the ratios of
these two subgroups of nonparty judges voting in favour
of applicants (or respondents) shall be close. The differ-
ences between the aforesaid ratios can be used to exam-
ine whether a nonparty judge is voting in a biased way
under the influence of the variables democracy, wealth
or language.
The other method is the regression tool. We use a simi-
lar regression equation as Posner and de Figueiredo’s.43
Our regression equation is as below:
Judge-Vote = a + b * [App-Nationality] + c * [Res-
Nationality]
+ d * [Democracy] + e * [Wealth]
+ f * [App-Language] + g * [Res-Language]
We conduct several regressions on the basis of the above
referred regression equation. The data that we use for
regressions include votes by all judges, either party or
nonparty. At the outset, we run a series of single-varia-
ble regressions with the data of the dependent variable
and each of the explanatory variables in the order of
app-nationality and res-nationality, democracy, app-lan-
guage and res-language, and wealth. Furthermore, we
run a series of double-variable regressions. The variable
nationality (i.e. app-nationality and res-nationality) is
involved in all these double-variable regressions, while
the other variable rotates in the order of democracy,
app-language and res-language, and wealth. In the end,
we run a multiple-variable regression involving all the
aforesaid explanatory variables.
4 Description of Data
The ICJ has adjudicated thirty-two cases in total
between 2005 and 2016.44 However, only in eighteen
43. Posner and de Figueiredo, above n. 26, at 611.
44. Data of the ICJ judgements, available at: <www. icj -cij. org/ en/ cases>
(last visited 25 November 2017).
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cases the ICJ judges had voted on substantive issues.45
Thus, we select these eighteen cases as our study subject
for the purpose of researching the voting pattern of ICJ
judges.
4.1 Party Judges
As mentioned above, ‘party judges’ are those who are
either nationals of (in the case of permanent judges) or
appointed by (in the case of ad hoc judges) applicants or
respondents. In eighteen cases, all applicants and
respondents have their party judges except in the 2009
Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa
Rica v. Nicaragua) case, the applicant, Costa Rica, did
not have its party judge.46 As a result, there are thirty-
five party judges in total, with seventeen of them
nationals of or appointed by applicants and eighteen
nationals of or appointed by respondents. In concreto,
only two of the thirty-five party judges are permanent
judges of the ICJ,47 while the remaining thirty-three
party judges are ad hoc judges. In this sense, in terms of
party judges, this research has more explanatory power
on the voting pattern of ad hoc judges rather than per-
manent party judges. Our data on the voting pattern of
party and nonparty judges are provided in Table 2.
As shown in Table 2, nonparty judges vote for appli-
cants or respondents about 50% of the time. By con-
trast, party judges vote for applicants that appoint them
about 88% of the time. Hence, the probability of a judge
voting in favour of the applicant increases by 37 per-
centage points when the applicant State appoints the
45. The list of these 18 cases is as follows: the 2005 Frontier Dispute
(Benin/Niger) case; the 2007 Application of the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herze-
govina v. Serbia and Montenegro) case; the 2007 Territorial and Mari-
time Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicaragua v. Honduras) case; the 2008 Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/
Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore)
case; the 2008 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters (Djibouti v. France) case; the 2009 Maritime Delimitation in the
Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine) case; the 2009 Dispute regarding Navi-
gational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) case; the 2010
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) case; the 2010
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of
the Congo) case; the 2011 Application of the Interim Accord of 13 Sep-
tember 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)
case; the 2012 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy:
Greece intervening) case; the 2012 Questions relating to the Obligation
to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) case; the 2012 Territorial
and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) case; the 2013 Frontier
Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger) case; the 2014 Maritime Dispute (Peru v.
Chile) case; the 2014 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New
Zealand intervening) case; the 2015 Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v.
Serbia) case; and the 2015 Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along
the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica) case.
46. At the beginning of the proceedings, Costa Rica chose Mr. Antônio
Cançado Trindade (Brazilian) as its ad hoc judge. But Mr. Cançado Trin-
dade was subsequently elected as a permanent judge of the ICJ. Costa
Rica informed the ICJ that it had decided not to choose a new ad hoc
judge. See the Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Cos-
ta Rica v. Nicaragua) case, Judgement of 13 July 2009, 10, para. 4.
47. These two permanent judges are: the German judge, Judge Bruno Sim-
ma, in the 2012 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Ita-
ly: Greece intervening) case; and the Japanese judge, Judge Hisashi
Owada, in the 2014 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New
Zealand intervening) case.
judge. Likewise, the probability of a judge voting in
favour of the respondent increases by 40 percentage
points when the respondent State appoints the judge.
As a result, there is substantial evidence that party judg-
es of the ICJ vote in favour of their home States or
appointing States.
Notably, among the thirty-five party judges, two perma-
nent judges, namely two out of two (100%), vote for
parties that are their home States. A majority of ad hoc
judges, namely twenty-nine out of thirty-three (88%),
vote in favour of their appointing States. There are only
four exceptions: Firstly, in the 2008 Certain Questions of
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v.
France) case, all sixteen judges, including the ad hoc
judge appointed by France, Judge Gilbert Guillaume,
unanimously voted in favour of the applicant’s key
claim, finding that “the French Republic…failed to
comply with its international obligation under Article 17
of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters between the two Parties”.48 Secondly, in the
2009 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v.
Ukraine) case, all fifteen judges, including the ad hoc
judge appointed by Ukraine, namely Judge Jean-Pierre
Cot, unanimously voted in favour of the applicant’s key
claim on drawing a single maritime boundary.49 Third-
ly, in the 2012 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicara-
gua v. Colombia) case, all fifteen judges, including the
ad hoc judge appointed by Nicaragua, namely Judge
Mohammed Bedjaoui, unanimously rejected the appli-
cant’s key claims.50 Fourthly, in the 2013 Frontier Dis-
pute (Burkina Faso/Niger) case, all seventeen judges,
including the ad hoc judge appointed by Burkina Faso,
48. Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v.
France), Judgement of 4 June 2008, para. 205(2)(a).
49. Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judge-
ment of 3 February 2009, para. 219.
50. Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgement
of 19 November 2012, para. 251(3)(4).
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namely Judge Yves Daudet, unanimously rejected the
applicant’s key claims.51
4.2 Nonparty Judges
We intend to study whether the voting pattern of non-
party judges is biased. For this purpose, we examine the
difference of the voting behaviour between two sub-
groups of nonparty judges: nonparty judges whose
home States or appointing States share the same or sim-
ilar political, economic or cultural levels with applicants
(or respondents), and other nonparty judges. On the
basis of the null hypothesis, we hypothesise that the vot-
ing pattern of nonparty judges would not differ regard-
less of whether their States have same majority language
as, or share closer political level or economic level to the
applicant (respondent) or not. The raw data of the varia-
ble language (app-language and res-language) are binary
and thus can be presented in the form of a descriptive
table. By contrast, the raw data of the variables democ-
racy and wealth are a series of discrete values and thus
will be presented in a different form.
Table 3 reports results for the voting pattern of nonpar-
ty judges whose States speak the same majority languag-
es as applicants (respondents) and other judges. Judges
whose States have different majority languages from
applicants (respondents) vote in favour of applicants
(respondents) about 50% of the time. When judges’
States speak the same majority languages as respond-
ents, the probability of these judges voting in favour of
51. Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), Judgement of 16 April 2013,
para. 114.
respondents increases by 32 percentage points. Howev-
er, the change is different when it comes to the situation
when judges’ States speak same majority languages as
applicants. As indicated by Table 3, there are sixteen
judges whose States speak same majority languages as
applicants, and only seven out of these sixteen judges
vote for applicants. Under this circumstance, the proba-
bility of judges voting for applicants decreased by 9 per-
centage points. In order to figure out the explanation for
this result, we have checked the voting details of the
remaining nine votes, and found that six of them actual-
ly happened when States of judges, applicants and
respondents all speak the same majority languages.52
Apparently in accordance with the collected data at
present, most judges favour respondents when such cir-
cumstance occurs. But it cannot be interpreted to
undermine the conclusion that judges of the ICJ vote in
favour of party States that speak the same majority lan-
guages as their States.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between democracy
alignment and the probability of a judge favouring the
applicant. The y-axis shows the probability of a judge
voting in favour of an applicant. The x-axis shows the
extent of the match between the democracy score of the
judge’s State with the applicant: the bigger the number,
the closer the extent of the match. The observations are
divided evenly among each value (0-5) on the x-axis
(about 39 per value).53 Figure 1 is in line with the pre-
dicted relationship described in our null hypothesis. A
judge is not more likely to vote for an applicant when
the judge’s State has a closer democracy score to that
applicant.
Likewise, Figure 2 shows the relationship between
wealth alignment and the likelihood of a judge voting in
favour of the applicant. The y-axis shows the probabili-
ty of a judge voting in favour of an applicant. The x-axis
shows the extent of the match between the wealth level
of the judge’s State with the applicant: the bigger the
52. This is the difference between the variable language and the variable
nationality. The State of a judge cannot be the same State as the appli-
cant and the respondent at the same time. But the State of a judge, the
applicant and the respondent can speak the same majority language.
53. For this purpose, we first sort the entries of the variable democra-
cy_measure from the smallest to the largest. Then we code the first
group of thirty-nine entries as value 0, the second, third, fourth and
fifth group of thirty-nine entries as values 1, 2, 3 and 4, and in the end
the sixth or last group of forty entries as value 5.
Table 2 Votes of party and nonparty judges
In Favour of Applicant In Favour of Respondent
Judges (N=270) Ratio % Ratio %
Party Judges 15/17 88 16/18 89
Nonparty Judges 119/235 51 116/235 49
Difference (percentage points) 37 40
Source: the ICJ judgements and the authors’ own calculations.
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number, the closer the extent of the match. The obser-
vations are divided evenly among each value (0-5) on
the x-axis (about 39 per value).54 Figure 2 endorses the
predicted relationship described in our null hypothesis.
A judge is not more likely to vote for an applicant when
the judge’s State has a closer wealth level to that appli-
cant.
5 Results
In this section, the result of several regressions will be
presented. As indicated by Posner and de Figueiredo,
the main obstacle for the regression is multicollinearity:
the variables, namely democracy, language and wealth,
are to some extent related.55 To address this problem,
we also run several regressions with different groups of
independent variables. Table 4 contains the results of
54. For this purpose, we first sort the entries of the variable wealth_meas-
ure from the smallest to the largest. Then we code the first group of
thirty-nine entries as value 0, the second, third, fourth and fifth group
of thirty-nine entries as values 1, 2, 3 and 4, and in the end the sixth or
last group of forty entries as value 5.
55. Posner and de Figueiredo, above n. 26, at 618.
these regressions, describing each variable’s standar-
dised coefficients, with P-values in parentheses.56
As can be seen from the regression results, the first row,
namely app-nationality variable, is highly significant in
all different regressions, and its coefficients are consis-
tent with the above observation that a judge who is the
national of or appointed by the applicant is more likely
to vote for the applicant. By contrast, the second varia-
ble, i.e. res-nationality, is significant in all regressions
except when the variable language (including variables
app-language and res-language) are involved (regres-
sions (5) and (8) in Table 4).
In terms of the variable democracy, it has significance
when considered alone (regression (2) in Table 4). How-
ever, when this variable is combined with the nationality
variable (including variables app-nationality and res-
nationality), the democracy variable loses its signifi-
cance. And when the multiple-variable regression is
56. There are eight regression results of (1) nationality; (2) democracy; (3)
nationality and democracy; (4) language; (5) nationality and language;
(6) wealth; (7) nationality and wealth; and (8) nationality, democracy,
language and wealth. Among them, (1), (3), (4) and (5) are calculated
on each variable independently, with the purpose of finding each varia-
ble’s coefficient and significance; (2), (4) and (6) are calculated with the
nationality variable since nationality is the most significant variable
according to the previous research and is the basis of democracy, lan-
guage and wealth as well; and (8) is the final overall result.
Table 3 Votes of judges whose states speak same majority languages as applicants (respondents) and other judges
In Favour of Applicant In Favour of Respondent
Judges (N=235) Ratio % Ratio %
Judges whose States speak same
majority languages as applicants
(respondents)
7/16 44 11/14 79
Other Judges 109/205 53 96/205 47
Difference (percentage points) –9 32
Source: the ICJ judgements, the database of Macalester.edu and the authors’ own calculations.
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conducted, the democracy variable lacks any signifi-
cance (regression (8) in Table 4).
Similarly, with respect to the variable language (includ-
ing variables app-language and res-language), it also has
significance when considered alone (regression (4) in
Table 4), but when this variable is combined with the
variable nationality, the variable app-language loses its
significance and the significance of the variable res-lan-
guage is weakened (regression (5) in Table 4). A similar
situation also exists in the multiple-variable regression
(regression (8) in Table 4).
As to the variable wealth, no significance is shown in all
regressions, no matter calculated alone in regression (6),
or taken into account other variables in regressions (7)
and (8).
6 Discussion
On the basis of the above results, we feel confident to
conclude that the variable nationality does play a role in
ICJ judges’ decision-makings. This finding regarding
cases between 2005 and 2016 is in line with Posner and
de Figueiredo’s finding for cases between 1946 and
2004. In their paper, both the variables app-nationality
and res-nationality are significant across all
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Table 4 Regression Results of Nationality, Democracy, Language and Wealth













































Adjusted R2 0.070 0.007 0.067 0.032 0.077 0.004 0.067 0.070
Notes: N=270. Standardised regression coefficients are reported. P-values are in parentheses. The dependent variable is judge-vote, which
equals to one if the judge rules in favour of the applicant and zero otherwise.
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
Source: the ICJ judgements, the databases of Polity IV, Macalester.edu & IMF, and the authors’ own calculations.
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regressions.57 On this basis, we can further conclude
that the significance of the variable nationality is consis-
tent across all time, from 1946 to 2016. In concreto, the
probability of party judges favouring applicants or
respondents increase by around 40 percentage points
across all time when compared with nonparty judges
(Table 2).
It is worth noting that 33 out of 35 party judges (94%)
involved in this empirical research are ad hoc judges.
Hence, the above conclusion about the voting behaviour
of party judges has more explanatory power on ad hoc
judges rather than permanent judges. Put differently, it
can be inferred from the results of this research that
nationality does play an important role in influencing
the voting pattern of ad hoc judges. Besides, as men-
tioned above, some scholars conclude that ad hoc judges
are more likely to favour the appointing States than per-
manent judges. Considering most of the party judges
involved in this research are ad hoc judges, the data of
this research are insufficient to confirm or negate the
above conclusion.
With respect to the variable democracy, it does not
show any significance in Figure 1 when assessing the
voting pattern of nonparty judges alone. By contrast,
when taking into account both party and nonparty judg-
es together, this variable shows significance in Table 4
(regression (2)). The latter analysis differs from the for-
mer in the sense that the latter adds the voting data of
party judges into discussion. Accordingly, it is sugges-
ted that the significance in regression mainly results
from party judges. As concluded above, the variable
nationality does influence the voting pattern of party
judges. Considering that the variables nationality and
democracy are co-related, the difference in significance
between these two results is understandable. This argu-
ment is also supported by regressions (3) and (4) in
Table 4, in which democracy loses significance when
combined with the nationality variable. To sum up, the
democracy variable has little impact on the voting pat-
tern of nonparty judges. Nonparty judges from demo-
cratic States do not necessarily favour democracies over
non-democracies, and vice versa. This is contrary to the
results of Posner and de Figueiredo’s research, which
found that the democracy variable had significance in
the voting behaviour of nonparty judges.58
The variable language, on the other hand, also exerts
influence on judges’ decision-making. As indicated by
regression (4) in Table 4, both the variables app-lan-
guage and res-language show a significant connection
with the dependent variable judge-vote. Inter alia, the
variable res-language has a higher correlation. This
finding is contrary to that concluded by Posner and de
Figueiredo. In their research, the variable app-language
showed stronger significance.59 Such contrast may
result from different cases selected. Another interesting
point deserving attention is regression (5) in Table 4.
57. Posner and de Figueiredo, above n. 26, at 619.
58. Ibid., at 617-18, 620.
59. Ibid.
The regression results show that when both variables
nationality and language are taken into account, the var-
iables res-nationality and app-language lose their signifi-
cance, and the significance of the variable res-language
becomes weaker. A possible explanation for this finding
may be that the variables nationality and language are
highly co-related. For example, when a judge’ State is
the same as the applicant (or respondent), that judge’s
State, for sure, speaks the same majority language as the
applicant (or respondent).
Regarding the remaining variable wealth, the results
shown in Figure 2 as well as in Table 4 are totally differ-
ent from Posner and de Figueiredo’s findings.60 We do
not find any significant correlation between the variable
wealth with judges’ voting pattern. Put differently, a
judge appointed by a poor State is not necessarily more
likely to vote in favour of a poor state than a wealthy
State, and vice versa. Different findings between cases
in the period 1946-2004 and cases during 2005-2016 in
this regard may result from the difference in numbers
and substances of the cases selected.61
Notably, the results of this empirical research are not
exactly the same as those of Posner and de Figueiredo’s,
especially with respect to the influence exerted by the
democracy and wealth alignments. These two variables
were significant in cases between 1946 and 2004, but not
any more in cases between 2005 and 2016. It is noted
that the world has experienced significant changes
around the Millennium, including the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, the end of the cold war, the emergence of
multi-polar world economy, globalisation and so on.
The diluted influence exerted by the democracy and
wealth alignments on the judges’ voting pattern may not
be an isolated or surprising event. Just as predicted by
Samuel P. Huntington in his classic work, The Clash of
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, “[w]orld
politics is entering a new phase…the fundamental
source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily
ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions
among humankind and the dominating source of con-
flict will be cultural”.62 This prediction also echoes with
our finding on the variable language that is shown to be
significant in influencing the ICJ judges’ voting pattern.
Various recommendations are raised to tackle the con-
cern that the voting behaviour of ad hoc judges is very
likely to be influenced by the political factor or national
interests. For example, it is suggested to deprive a judge
ad hoc of the right to vote.63 The rationale behind this
suggestion is that since “the function of the judge ad hoc
is one of understanding and interpretation”, “the right
to vote does not seem to be a necessity”.64 However,
60. Ibid.
61. It is worthy of note that Posner and de Figueiredo’s data set is about
four to five times larger than ours. Unfortunately, we cannot obtain
their raw data in the public domain. Therefore, we cannot conduct fur-
ther comparison between their raw data and ours.
62. S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order (1997), at 22.
63. Kuijer, above n. 17, at 67.
64. Ibid.
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practically speaking, in order to make his/her voice or
the additional information he/she provides heard and
considered by other judges, it is very important that the
judge ad hoc acts as a full member of the Bench.65 More-
over, as shown by the results of this empirical research,
the voting behaviour of nonparty judges is also influ-
enced by other factors such as culture. Following the
same rationale of the above suggestion, these nonparty
judges should also be deprived of the right to vote. Con-
sequently, none of the judges, including party and non-
party judges, should be entitled to vote, which is appa-
rently ridiculous and impractical. Hence, the suggestion
of depriving a judge ad hoc of the right to vote is untena-
ble.
Meanwhile, the current appointing mechanism of ad hoc
judges should be reformed to lessen the interference of
the States concerned.66 The fifteen permanent judges of
the ICJ are recommended by State parties to the ICJ
Statute and elected for nine-year terms by the concur-
rent action of the General Assembly and the Security
Council of the UN.67 By contrast, ad hoc judges are sim-
ply designated by a State to the dispute.68 Though the
State concerned is recommended to give preference to
those who have been nominated as candidates for per-
manent judges of the ICJ, this preference is not obliga-
tory and in practice, the State has often bypassed the
candidate list.69 In this light, some scholar proposes to
reinforce the appointing mechanism of ad hoc judges
through the following reforms:
each member State would be obliged to file a list if
three candidates for the position of judge ad hoc at
the Registry of the Court before a dispute has risen.
In case a judge ad hoc is subsequently needed, the
Registry can contact the first candidate without fur-
ther interference of the state concerned. Should the
first candidate be unavailable, the registrar would be
able to contact the second and third candidates. In
addition, member states could be urged not to
appoint a judge ad hoc when neither party to a dis-
pute is represented on the Bench by a regular judge.70
Regardless of whether this proposal will be accepted in
practice by States parties to the ICJ Statute, this pro-
posal tends to weaken the function of ad hoc judges,
which, as mentioned above, is for the purpose of ensur-
ing the full understanding of the case presented by a
State party and further increasing the confidence of that
State in participating in the judicial proceedings.
Taking a step back, a normative question raised here is
whether the biased voting behaviour of the judges,
including party and nonparty, will lead to the unfair
interpretation or application of law. The key to answer-
ing this question is to determine whether such voting
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Arts. 4 and 5 of the ICJ Statute.
68. Art. 31 of the ICJ Statute.
69. Samore, above n. 24, at 196.
70. Kuijer, above n. 17, at 67.
behaviour is a proper exercise of the discretion power of
a judge. It is widely accepted that the judges’ discretion
is inevitable. Both legal positivists and legal naturalists
acknowledge that judges are entitled to exercise their
discretion power during judicial procedures.71
Nevertheless, a judge’s discretion is definitely not “free
to reach any result he pleases as long as he is able to give
some legally plausible argument for it”.72 Instead, a
judge “must give the decision that he honestly thinks is
best, and reasons which he sincerely regards as the best
reasons he is able to give”.73 A question naturally arises
as to which factors should be taken into consideration by
a judge when deciding what constitutes the best decision
and the best reasons. In this regard, Thomas M. Franck
proposed as below:
since [judgements are] made by men who, in their
attitudes, proclivities, and intellectual tendencies, are
to a significant degree products of the environments
that related them to local and national systems of
social values, there can be no man impartial in dis-
putes between States.74
As shown by this empirical research, the voting pattern
of party or nonparty judges is influenced by the political
or cultural factors. In this sense, these two factors can be
regarded as the influential factors that a judge takes into
account when exercising his/her own discretion power.
It is understandable that judges are trained to best exer-
cise their discretion, and that such training is inevitably
associated with certain political and cultural contexts.
This research cannot draw any conclusion regarding
whether judges consciously vote in a biased pattern. It is
possible that a judge votes for a State party to the dis-
pute that happens to share similar politics or culture
with his/her home State without any intention. Conse-
quently, given that discretion is allowed in all legal sys-
tems including the system of international law, the
influence exerted by the political or cultural factors on
the voting behaviour of the judges does not necessarily
lead to the unfair interpretation or application of law.
Instead, the coming-into-play of these factors may be
considered as a proper exercise of the discretion power
of a judge.
71. Regarding the opinions of legal positivists, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept
of Law, 2nd ed. (1994). Ronald Dworkin objected to the discretion
theory as proposed by legal positivists. In his view, positivists proposed
a strong disrection that judges might reach decisions free from legal
standards. Nevertheless, he acknowleged the existence of two types of
weaker discretion, namely judgement discretion (judges can reach deci-
sions with their own judgement when the standards cannot be applied
mechanically) and finality discretion (judges can make final decisions
without being reviewed or reversed by other authorities). See R. Dwor-
kin, ‘Judicial Discretion’, 60 The Journal of Philosophy 624, at 624-38
(1963); R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1978), at 31-9. Criticism
regarding Dworkin’s position, see J. Raz, ‘Legal Principles and the Limits
of Law’, 81 The Yale Law Journal 823, at 823-54 (1972).
72. T.D. Perry, ‘Judicial Method and the Concept of Reasoning’, 80 Ethics
1, at 9 (1969).
73. Ibid.
74. T.M. Franck, ‘Some Psychological Factors in International Third-Party
Decision-Making’, 19 Stanford Law Review 1217, at 1220 (1966).
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7 Conclusion
The data provide strong evidence that judges of the ICJ
favour applicants that appoint them, and that judges
favour respondents that speak same majority languages
as their States, and weaker evidence that judges favour
respondents that appoint them, and more weakly or no
evidence that judges favour applicants that speak same
majority languages as their States or that judges are
influenced by democracy and wealth alignments. These
results suggest that political and cultural factors do play
a role in influencing the decision-making of the ICJ
judges.
Nevertheless, to avoid doubt, this research has not
shown that judges are consciously biased. All it has
shown is that their voting pattern is not in line with the
manners described by the null hypothesis. A judge does
not necessarily consciously decide to vote in favour of a
State that is the same or similar to his or her own State.
It is also possible that when a State party needs to
appoint a person as a judge in the ICJ, the State may
tend to appoint a person with legal opinions in favour of
its part at the beginning. All in all, this research aims at
providing an empirical perspective on the voting pattern
of ICJ judges. It does not reveal that the cases would
have been decided more impartially if all the validated
bias triggers had been prohibited. In the end, this
research does not suggest that the biased voting pattern
of the ICJ judges will necessarily lead to unfair interpre-
tation or application of law.174
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